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Abstract
A mathematical model of dependence between two network layers, a dependent
layer and an independent layer, is analyzed for its ability to capture cascading
failures from one layer to another. A binary variable that captures whether or
not a specific node is active is used to tie the two layers together. This methodology
is applied to the interaction of the High Voltage Italian Electrical Transmission
(HVIET) network and Italian high bandwidth internet network for research (GARR)
network to test its viability and practicality. Vital nodes and node pairs in the
HVIET network are identified using the model, and potential strategies for hardening
the system are proposed. Further testing should evaluate different methods of linking
the two layers.
1 Problem Statement
As networks have become larger and more complex, so have the interactions be-
tween them. The communications network alone has grown to include phone lines,
cellular networks, and the internet along with the mail system and other more tra-
ditional methods of communicating information. Many aspects of one network can
be supported by another network. One example of this is the power grid, which
is often modeled as its own separate network composed of power generation plants,
distribution lines, and transformers, yet many networks such as the communications
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network listed above depend on the grid to function. For example, many phones and
computers in the communications network depend on the power supplied to them
as modeled in the electrical network. Also, many operations in the electrical net-
work depend on appropriate communication which is modeled in the communication
network. If a disruption occurs in one network, there can be unforseen cascading
failures in other networks. As summarized in the following paragraphs, a vast body
of literature exists in regard to using optimization to characterize vulnerabilities in
independent networks, but little work has examined interdependent networks in the
same context.
Two existing research areas that employ optimization to addres network vul-
nerability are interdiction and fortification. These two approaches represent two
different sides of the same problem: One aims to find a system’s weakness in order
to exploit it, while the other aims to harden a system against interdiction.
Network interdiction, as pioneered in [1], focuses on an interdictor disrupting a
single network in an attempt to prevent an operator from achieving an objective. As
the Rutcor Research Report notes, one key field that stands to gain from progress
in interdiction modeling is counter-terrorism [2], which is a natural application for
interdependent network models given the wide variety of threats. The Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, for instance, mentions network interdependence as a
research area of interest [3].
Network fortification involves building a more robust network so as to minimize
damage and “guarantee continuity and efficiency in service provision in the face of
natural and man-made threats” [4]. One specific instance motivating the importance
of interdependent network modeling in network fortification is seen in the failure of
the High Voltage Italian Electrical Transmission (HVIET) network in 2003 and
its subsequent effect on the Italian high bandwidth internet network for research
(GARR) network [5]. Rosato states in this article, “An outage on the electrical
network is able to produce a larger effect on the communication network.” Thus,
a model able to capture these cascading effects would be useful to any association
interested in determining weaknesses in their networks so that measures can be taken
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to fortify against disruptions at these points.
This research aims to develop a mathematical model that captures the cascading
failures in a two layer network from an independent layer to a dependent layer.
The model will function as a basis for future research in interdependent network
vulnerability. It must be able to determine failures in the dependent layer based on
disruptions in the independent layer and allow a user to identify key points in the
independent layer that are susceptible to failure.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Italian Power Grid
Research on the failure of Italy’s power grid, as mentioned above, has already been
completed. Buldyrev et al. describe how cascading failures between the HVIET
network and GARR network occur. Each node in the HVIET is paired with a node
in the GARR network, and it is assumed both nodes in the pair are dependent
on each other. Also, it is assumed that if a HVIET node is disconnected from
other HVIET nodes, then the associated connections between GARR nodes must
become disconnected, and vice versa. From there, the cascading failures resulting
in the isolation of sections of the network caused by the removal of a single node
can be seen [6]. This depiction of the networks summarizes key characteristics of
both networks and assumes bi-directional dependency between the two networks in
order to show these failures. While useful for understanding the portions of both
networks that are at risk of becoming isolated, this method assumes bi-directional
dependency, which is not always the case. The isolation of nodes in one network due
to the isolation of its paired node in the other network creates a dependency that is
not always present in networks. Nodes in one network may interact even though the
nodes they depend on in other networks are not directly correlated. This is another
aspect of cascading failures that we are attempting to discover.
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2.2 Disruptive Model
In [7], Kennedy captures the interdependencies of networks by determining the effect
of a single action on each network involved. Much of his research is applied towards
militaristic actions, such as sabotaging roads or telecommunications. Because of
this, the interdependency of the networks lies in the action itself, but the disruptions
within the networks remain independent. For example, if a bridge is sabotaged so
that it is unusable and any power lines or water pipes attached are damaged and
rendered unusable as well, the attack is modeled as one attack that affects all three
networks: transportation, electrical, and sanitary; however, the resulting effects are
calculated independently. This approach is useful in that it allows a larger problem
to be broken down into multiple subproblems that are easier to solve using Benders
partitioning, but limits the model in determining cascading failures. Any further
interactions between the networks beyond the initial disruption will not be captured.
Kennedy overcomes this issue by taking all cascading failures into consideration as
an initial affect of the attack. While this approach is useful given prior knowledge
of the effects of a disruption, it is geared towards disruptive and offensive actions
where partial analysis of disruptions has already been completed. This approach
may be suitable if such knowledge is available, but other models are necessary in
order to uncover the potential damages that could occur from unforeseen cascading
failures in interdependent networks.
2.3 Restoration Model
Wallace provides another technique for modeling interdependent networks in [8].
Many infrastructures were affected in the weeks following the terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center in 2001 including the transportation, electrical, and even
sewage networks. His research was conducted in response to these attacks to help
identify network interdependencies and therefore manage them. Wallace presents as
an appendix a restoration model that links multiple networks. His method focused
on minimizing the shortfalls across all networks, which were calculated as unmet
demands, and activating as many interdependent nodes as possible. A binary vari-
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able is introduced that limits the availability of a node in one network depending on
conditions in another network. This concept allows for cascading failures between
interdependent networks to be captured. However, no work was shown supporting
the model. The use of a binary variable to show the interdependence of one network
on another is plausible, but untested. The model presented in this research expands
upon the Wallace model by applying it to a two-layer scenario and modifying the
objective function.
3 Two-Layer Model
3.1 Model Detail
In building this model, a few key terms will be used. A layer is an individual network
associated with its own commodity that flows through the layer. The combination
of both layers defines the network as a whole. A supply node in either is a node
that provides the units flowing through the layer. A demand node receives the units
flowing through the layer. Transport nodes neither supply or demand units, but units
can flow through these nodes from supply nodes to reach demand nodes. A node
is deemed active if the demand in both layers at that node are satisfied. Transport
and supply nodes in the first layer are always active since they are independent of
the second layer.
There are two layers present. Each layer has its own set of supply, demand,
and transport nodes and arcs connecting the nodes. Nodes can be present in both
layers. The nodes have corresponding values of supply, and the arcs have capacities
and costs, when necessary. The arcs are also constrained by whether or not a node
is active. If a node’s first layer demands are not met, then its arc capacities are
constrained to zero in the second layer to prevent its utilization.
3.2 Mathematical Representation
There exists a set of nodes N1 which represent all nodes in the first layer. Each
node, i ∈ N1, has a corresponding s1i to represent how much power it provides,
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with negative numbers representing demand nodes and zero representing transport
nodes. For these nodes, there exists a set of arcs A1 ⊆ (N1, N1) for which units
supplied can flow from one node to another. The parameter c1ij is introduced to
represent a capacity on all first layer arcs (i, j) ∈ A1. As for the second layer,
there exists a set of nodes N2 that represent all nodes directly involved in the flow
of the second layer’s units. Each node, i ∈ N2, has a correseponding parameter
s2i representing the number of units supplied at that node, with negative numbers
representing demand nodes and zero representing transport nodes. For these nodes,
there exists a set of arcs A2 ⊆ (N2, N2) for which units can flow within the second
layer. Each arc,(i, j) ∈ A2, has a a capacity c2ij . A third set N is created by the
union of sets N1 and N2. This is necessary to allow the binary variable di, i ∈ N
to be created which determines whether or not a node in the second layer is active
based on whether or not that same node receives adequate resources in the first
layer. Variables X1ij , (i, j) ∈ A1 and X2ij , (i, j) ∈ A2 are created to track the flow of
resources in the first and second layers, respectively.
The objective function taken into consideration is focused on maximizing the
weighted total number of active demand nodes in both layers. Often, the scope of
the decisions being made to allocate the resources in the independent network goes
beyond one dependent network, and decisions may be made with varying amounts
of consideration towards the dependent network being studied. To capture this
effect, three weight parameters are added: α, β, and δ. A new set of nodes, N3 ≡
{i ∈ N2 : s2i < 0}, is created that contains all demand nodes in the second layer,
set N4 ≡ {i ∈ N1 ∩ N2 : s1i < 0} is created that contains all demand nodes in
the first layer that support the second layer, and another set of nodes, N5 ≡ {i ∈
N1 \N2 : s1i < 0}, is created that contains all demand nodes in the first layer that
do not support the second layer. By splitting the demand nodes in the first layer
into two groups, nodes supporting the second layer and nodes not supporting the
second layer, we can set the sum of the weights of demand nodes supporting the
second layer and the demand nodes in the second layer to be equal to the weight of
demand nodes in the first layer not supporting the second layer. Setting a positive
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weight on non-supportive first layer nodes allows for modeling a tradeoff between
using first-layer supplies to satisfy first-layer demands and using first-layer supplies
to support dependent second-layer nodes. The model is as follows:
max
∑
i∈N3
αdi +
∑
i∈N4
βdi +
∑
i∈N5
δdi (1)
s.t.
∑
j∈N1:(i,j)∈A1
X1ij −
∑
j∈N1:(j,i)∈A1
X1ji ≤ s1i di, ∀ i ∈ N1 (2)∑
j∈N2:(i,j)∈A2
X2ij −
∑
j∈N2:(j,i)∈A2
X2ji ≤ s2i di, ∀ i ∈ N2 (3)
0 ≤ X1ij ≤ c1ij , ∀ ij ∈ A1 (4)
0 ≤ X2ij ≤ c2ijdi, ∀ ij ∈ A2 (5)
di ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈ N (6)
X1ij ≥ 0, integer, ∀ ij ∈ A1 (7)
X2ij ≥ 0, integer, ∀ ij ∈ A2 (8)
Equations (2) and (3) are standard network flow constraints requiring the flow
out of a node less the flow into the node to be at least as much as the supply of the
node. For supply nodes, this allows it to send up to as much supply as it has but
no more. For demand nodes, it must receive its demand or it will be deactivated.
For transport nodes, no supply can be sent unless it is received. By multiplying
the capacity of an arc by an indicator of whether or not the sending node is active,
as outlined in Equation (5), no node in the second layer can send flow unless it is
active. Equation (4) constrains the flow along an arc in the first layer to its alotted
capacity.
3.3 Alternative Objectives
This model can easily be adapted to account for alternative objectives. One exam-
ple is setting the objective to maximize the total number of demand nodes in the
dependent layer. This would be a situation in which the first layer, the independent
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layer, is solely supporting the dependent layer:
max
∑
i∈N3
di (9)
Another objective function is one for normal operations. If the independent net-
work solely supports the dependent network and no disruptions are present, then an
objective function seeking to reduce the amount of resources used could be utilized.
A resource requirement r2ij that represents the cost per unit flow of using an arc is
created and the objective function is changed to the following:
min
∑
ij∈A2
r2ijX
2
ij (10)
Equation (3) must be modified as well. Since we are assuming that it is possible
to satisfy all demands and our objective function is now to minimize the objective
value, we must alter the equation to prevent the model from setting the di variable
to 0 and deactivating all nodes to achieve an objective function value of 0. The
following is a simple way to complete this:
∑
j∈N2:ij∈A2
X2ij −
∑
j∈N2:ji∈A2
X2ji ≤ s2i ∀ i ∈ N2 (11)
An important note when working with a minimum cost flow model in the presence of
disruptions is that dummy arcs directly from the supply nodes to the demand nodes
must be present to ensure that there is a feasible solution. High costs, in this case
lengths, are assigned to these arcs so that the model only uses them if necessary.
4 Computational Analysis
4.1 Data Set
From the data set provided in [5], the HVIET and GARR networks were mapped
out. Each node in the GARR network was paired with the closest node in the
HVIET network to be its power source and therefore the node it is dependent on.
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Node sets N1 and N2 were constructed from the HVIET and GARR networks,
respectively, and N1∩N2 was defined to correspond to the aforementioned pairings.
Supply, demand, and transport nodes in the HVIET network that occupied the
same location were consolidated into one node to simplify the model. The capacity
for each HVIET arc was set to 2.5, which was determined by finding the minimum
arc capacity that would allow all nodes to be active, as they were not provided
with the data set. The capacity for each GARR arc was arbitrarily set to 5. The
supply or demand for HVIET nodes was provided. The connections between nodes
in the HVIET network were modeled as undirected arcs in an attempt to capture
the interconnectivity of an electrical network. Figure 1 provides a map with the two
networks overlayed onto Italy.
Figure 1: HVIET and GARR Networks
A sample situation was created to test the ability of the model to appropriately
capture the cascading effects of a failure in the HVIET layer into the GARR layer
of the network. Information would be sent from the northern regions to the south-
ern regions of Italy and attacks would be made throughout the HVIET layer. The
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resulting effects of these disruptions on the GARR layer are first verified to demon-
strate model functionality. Then, the HVIET layer is analyzed to discover key pairs
of nodes and determine methods to prevent failure at said nodes.
Nine nodes in the northern regions of Italy were selected as supply nodes for
the GARR layer: 117, 127, 129, 150, 164, 167, 205, 206, and 207. Artificial supply
nodes were created to represent users inputting information into the GARR layer
at these points. Nine more nodes were selected in the southern regions as demand
nodes: 118, 122, 134, 155, 162, 170, 178, 182, and 196. Artificial demand nodes
were created at these nodes to represent users demanding information. Each node
supplied or demanded one unit of information. These nodes are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: GARR Network with Supply and Demand Nodes
The unmodified constraints and the objective function outlined in Equation (1)
with α, β, and δ set to 1, 9, and 10 respectively were used for analysis. These
values were chosen because the sum of α and β is equal to δ, meaning the model
would not prioritize demand nodes in the GARR layer over those in the HVIET
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layer. This represents the case where decisions over the allocation of resources in
the independent layer are made regardless of the implications in the dependent layer.
All model tests were run using AMPL with the CPLEX solver.
After a few initial tests of the model for debugging purposes, it was noticed
that the di variable tended to leave transport nodes deactivated since the variable
is multiplied by the supply, 0, as shown in Equation (2). This was resolved by
feeding AMPL a starting solution where all di-variables were set to 1, letting them
be deactivated if their requirements could not be met.
4.2 Model Functionality
The model was first tested to ensure its ability to appropriately deactivate nodes
in the dependent GARR layer after losing power from the HVIET layer. Node 162
was identified as a demand node in the HVIET layer with a corresponding node in
the GARR layer. All incoming arc capacities in the HVIET layer were set to 0 to
simulate a loss of power at the node. This situation is shown below in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Cascading Failure Test
The model appropriately deactivated the node, decreasing the number of active
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demand nodes in the GARR layer. The model also captured the deactivation of
demand nodes 178 and 134. The model results verified this with the variable values
of d134, d162, and d178 set to 0. The model was therefore able to appropriately
capture the cascading failures from the independent network to the dependent.
4.3 Practical Analysis
A script was created to determine node pairs in the HVIET layer that were vital to
the GARR layer. The script cycled through all possible combinations of node pairs
setting any arcs in the HVIET layer as well as the di variable associated with the
nodes to 0. The script also recorded the value of the following equation for each
node pair: ∑
i∈N3
di (12)
This equation is the same as the objective function defined in Equation (9), but
it was calculated and recorded separately, not as the objective function. This was
done to track the demand nodes in the GARR layer that are active since they are
the nodes of interest, while allowing the model to still solve itself without biasing
toward these nodes. The resulting data was analyzed to determine which nodes were
critical in the reception of demand nodes in the GARR network, and which pairs of
nodes were critical to overall network flow. The node pairs that resulted in the most
demand nodes deactivated, or least demand nodes activated, in the GARR layer are
recorded in Table 1.
Table 1: Node Pair Results
Node 1 Node 2
Active GARR
Demand Nodes
118 174 0
118 162 3
118 182 3
162 182 3
174 182 3
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All nodes were then analyzed to see which nodes were the most vital. This
was determined by finding the average number of GARR demand nodes deactivated
when a particular node was present in the node pair removed. Supply and demand
nodes were identified that, when removed along with any other node, resulted in 1.5
GARR layer demand nodes deactivating on average. Transport nodes that, when
removed along with any other node, resulted in 0.5 GARR Layer demand nodes de-
activating on average. The one-point discrepancy between the supply and demand
node cutoff and the transport node cutoff accounts for the fact that if a node is
disabled in the HVIET layer that is directly supporting demand in the GARR layer,
the active demand nodes in the GARR layer will always drop by one. These results
are seen in Table 2. The type of node is also included to draw attention to nodes
that do not directly supply power to supply or demand nodes in the second layer.
Table 2: Individual Node Results
Node
Active GARR Node
Demand Nodes Type
118 5.85 D
162 5.91 D
182 5.92 D
129 6.93 S
122 7.42 D
108 7.76 T
158 8.25 T
258 8.28 T
2 8.30 T
27 8.30 T
125 8.42 T
45 8.50 T
Nodes 118, 162, and 182 were identified as key individual nodes since their re-
moval resulted in an average of three or more demand nodes in the GARR network
to not receive information. These nodes are shown below in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Key Nodes 118, 162, 182
Two of these nodes serve as hubs for local demands: 118 and 162. A proposed
solution is to either create another hub that is dependent on a separate power
source in the HVIET network and connects the local demand centers or to directly
link the demand nodes to other nodes in the GARR network. The third node, 182,
serves as the connection between the east and west network routes. Removal of
this node results in constrained capacities for information traveling along arcs in the
GARR network. To resolve this issue, capacity must be increased for nearby routes
or parallel arcs need to be installed.
Two more nodes, 129 and 122, were vital to the network, though not as important
as the previously mentioned three nodes. Both nodes controlled the local flow of
power in their regions. The solution would be to implement parallel lines.
So far, the nodes identified have been crucial because they were directly involved
in supplying power to nodes in the GARR network. Nodes 2, 27, 45, 108, 125, 158,
and 258 were identified as key nodes that indirectly supported the GARR network.
These nodes are all highlighted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: HVIET Nodes Causing Cascading Failures
Node 108 is not a supply, transfer, or demand node in the GARR network, yet if
removed would result in an average of 7.76 active demand nodes instead of all 9. By
viewing the HVIET network map, it can be seen that node 108 is a major supply
node in the HVIET network that provides power in the southwestern region of Italy.
The loss of this node would remove power to local GARR demand nodes. The same
situation applies to nodes 2, 27, and 45, which provide a large proportion of local
power. A possible solution to this issue is to install alternative power supply stations
in their respective regions. Nodes 125, 158, and 258 function as key path nodes in
the HVIET network along Italy’s east and west coasts. These nodes would benefit
from parallel arcs to reduce depedence. Another important observation is that the
three nodes 27, 158, and 258, as well as the two nodes 2 and 125, are co-located.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that capacity is constrained at these
points and therefore each node is of more importance.
The analysis of node pairs identified a few crucial pairings. The node pair (118,
174) is vital to the network. If both nodes are removed, the northern section of
the GARR network is completely disconnected to the southern region resulting in
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0 active demand nodes. The removal of node pair (174, 182) would result in only
3 active demand nodes in the GARR network. These pairings prove the need for
another route in the GARR network along the west coast. The impact of Node 174
is interesting because it has little effect on the network on average when removed
with another node. These two pairings are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Key Node Pairs
The other three node pairs identified as vital were only of importance because the
nodes in the pairing themselves were vital.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Model Effectiveness
The mathematical model provided captured the effect of cascading failures from one
network to another. By analyzing the removal of node pairs, crucial nodes in the
HVIET network could be identified as indirectly affecting the ability of the GARR
network to transfer information from the northern regions of Italy to the southern
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regions. The concept of using a binary variable adequately allowed one network to
depend on another.
While the binary variable di captured dependencies, it required a node to be
present in both layers. In the given analysis, all nodes in the GARR layer that
required power were combined with the closest demand node in the HVIET layer.
This accurately represents the observed networks since the nodes demanding power
in HVIET layer are the nodes transferring information in the GARR layer. Merging
nodes may not be possible when modeling other networks, since there may not
be a direct, geographic link from a node in one network to that of another. If
multiple nodes in one layer are dependent on a single node in another layer, they all
merge into one node. This issue would become exponentially problematic the more
layers and dependencies present. A different way of showing dependence should be
researched to better model a node’s dependence. Binary variables that link two
different nodes together by allowing one to be active if another is active would
provide more flexibility to the model.
Another issue that arose was modelling the objective function to adequately rep-
resent the decision making process. As discussed earlier, one layer of the overall
network may make decisions without regard to other, dependent layers. The con-
sequences of this decision must be dealt with by the dependent layers. this model
resolved that issue by weighing the demand nodes in each layer equally to prevent
bias in supplying power to demand nodes in the HVIET layer. But, a small bias
was inevitable in that demand nodes in the HVIET layer that supported nodes in
the GARR layer that could not be satisfied, and therefore activated, due to other
constraints were replaced by demand nodes in the HVIET network that supported
satisfiable nodes in the GARR network. This was due to the weight system imple-
mented in the objective function. To resolve this bias, the model should be solved in
multiple steps corresponding to the different times a decision is made by each layer
with the objective function appropriately reflecting the decision values. This could
be repeated until all variable values are determined.
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5.2 Future Direction
The next step with this model is to incorporate two-way dependence to capture
cascading failures from one network to another and then to the original network
again. This may be accomplished by applying Equation (2) to another layer. In
this case, it would require the binary variable applied to the flow of the HVIET
network. Of course, a different data set would need to be provided that includes
these dependencies. Another step would be to add more layers to the network to
introduce more complex interactions and build a model that can capture multiple
dependencies.
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